Articles
H.J. McCann, 'God, Sin, and Rogers on Anselm: A Reply' in Faith and Philosophy, 26 (2009) 420-431.
T. Noone, 'Truth, Creation, and Intelligibility in Anselm, Grosseteste, and Bonaventure' in Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, 51 (2010) 102-126.
S.N. Vaughn, 'Saint Anselm and His Students Writing about Love: A Theological Foundation for the Rise of Romantic Love in Europe' in Journal of the History of Sexuality, 19 (2010) 54-73.
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Saturday, 6 February 2010
Saturday, 30 January 2010
Ralph McInerny (1929-2010)
I was saddened to hear that Ralph McInerny, who had been ill for some time, died yesterday (29 January 2010). He was well-known as a teacher, Thomist philosopher and novelist, but also for his translations of some of Anselm's works in the edition produced by Brian Davies and Gillian Evans, Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works. I had the good fortune to meet him when he was a visiting professor at Blackfriars in Hilary term 2008. He is remembered here and here.
Sunday, 17 January 2010
Recent Publications - January 2010
Articles
Michael Barnwell, 'De Casu Diaboli: An Examination of Faith and Reason Via a Discussion of the Devil's Sin' in Saint Anselm Journal, 6 (2009) ??-??
Y. Nagasawa, 'The ontological argument and the devil' in The Philosophical Quarterly, 60 (2010) 72-91
Katherin A. Rogers, 'Anselm on Forgiveness, Patience, and Free Will' in Saint Anselm Journal, 6 (2009) ??-??
Daniel Shannon, 'Justifying Atonement: An Anselmian Response to Modern Critics' in Saint Anselm Journal, 6 (2009) ??-??
Reviews
Ian Logan, 'Katherin Rogers, Anselm on Freedom' in New Blackfriars, 91 (2010) 104-105.
Michael Barnwell, 'De Casu Diaboli: An Examination of Faith and Reason Via a Discussion of the Devil's Sin' in Saint Anselm Journal, 6 (2009) ??-??
Y. Nagasawa, 'The ontological argument and the devil' in The Philosophical Quarterly, 60 (2010) 72-91
Katherin A. Rogers, 'Anselm on Forgiveness, Patience, and Free Will' in Saint Anselm Journal, 6 (2009) ??-??
Daniel Shannon, 'Justifying Atonement: An Anselmian Response to Modern Critics' in Saint Anselm Journal, 6 (2009) ??-??
Reviews
Ian Logan, 'Katherin Rogers, Anselm on Freedom' in New Blackfriars, 91 (2010) 104-105.
Thursday, 14 January 2010
Anselm's argument and the 'devil' parody
Yujin Nagasawa has just published an article which attempts to refute two versions of the 'devil' parody of Anselm's argument (those of Millican and Chambers). (See Y. Nagasawa, 'The ontological argument and the devil' in The Philosophical Quarterly, 60 (2010) 72-91.) Nagasawa's conclusion is that such attempted parodies fail as parodies because they are not structurally parallel to Anselm's argument (to which he unhelpfully, but in common with so many others, insists on referring as the ontological argument) or because they make assumptions that a proponent of Anselm's argument does not need to make. If one restructures a parody argument to meet these points, it is no longer a parody argument, but the argument itself (p.91).
One point that Nagasawa does not address is my suggestion that the proof of anti-God is a proof of the non-existence of anything that is nothing. (See Reading Anselm's Proslogion, p. 183). My view is that 'nothing' is a more accurate inversion of 'God' than 'devil'. In this way we can have a parody of Anselm's argument, which is not Anselm's argument, but is formally valid and produces a true conclusion. Of course, this would support the contention that Anselm's argument is sound.
My parody runs thus:
'Anti-God is that than which a lesser cannot be thought.
Anti-God does not exist in the understanding [alone] or it is not anti-God, since it is less great for it not to exist in reality than for it not to exist in the understanding [alone].
Therefore anti-God does not exist in the understanding or in reality, since this is less great than not existing in the understanding [alone].'
One point that Nagasawa does not address is my suggestion that the proof of anti-God is a proof of the non-existence of anything that is nothing. (See Reading Anselm's Proslogion, p. 183). My view is that 'nothing' is a more accurate inversion of 'God' than 'devil'. In this way we can have a parody of Anselm's argument, which is not Anselm's argument, but is formally valid and produces a true conclusion. Of course, this would support the contention that Anselm's argument is sound.
My parody runs thus:
'Anti-God is that than which a lesser cannot be thought.
Anti-God does not exist in the understanding [alone] or it is not anti-God, since it is less great for it not to exist in reality than for it not to exist in the understanding [alone].
Therefore anti-God does not exist in the understanding or in reality, since this is less great than not existing in the understanding [alone].'
Sunday, 20 December 2009
Recent Publications - December 2009
Articles
Sara L. Uckelman, 'Anselm's Logic of Agency' in Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy, 12 (2009) 248-268.
Sara L. Uckelman, 'Anselm's Logic of Agency' in Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy, 12 (2009) 248-268.
Friday, 18 December 2009
When is Anselm's argument Anselm's argument?
An interesting paper from earlier this year is P. Schlenker, 'Anselm's argument and Berry's paradox' in Noûs, 43 (2009) 214-223. A version can be found here.
A problem with this paper, like so many others, is that it claims to have found where Anselm's Proslogion argument goes wrong. It is interesting to note how many different, competing ways of going wrong there supposedly are in Anselm's argument. I suspect that there needs to be more care taken with the hermeneutics of translation from natural to formal logical language.
As Geach and Strawson famously pointed out, 'there is no one logical form that is the form of a given concrete argument; one and the same argument may correspond to more than one abstract schema; and accordingly an argument is not shown to be invalid by sharing some logical form with an invalid argument, for it may simultaneously have some form that makes it into a valid argument.' (P. Geach, 'Why Logic Matters' in H.D. Lewis, Contemporary British Philosophy: Personal Statements, Fourth Series, London 1976, pp. 86-99, p. 95.
One lesson to be drawn from this is that coming up with something that sounds like it might bear some relation to what Anselm thought does not constitute the basis for an account of what he thought that is sufficiently nuanced to allow one to draw the conclusion that his argument was unsound and/or invalid. At best, using such an approach one could demonstrate the invalidity or unsoundness of one's own account. But from the perspective of Anselm studies, that would not be very interesting. It would be useful to produce a set of criteria that would allow one to come to a conclusion about the formal validity at least of a complex natural language argument. One of those criteria would have to be that provided by Geach and Strawson: 'there is no one logical form that is the form of a given concrete argument'.
A problem with this paper, like so many others, is that it claims to have found where Anselm's Proslogion argument goes wrong. It is interesting to note how many different, competing ways of going wrong there supposedly are in Anselm's argument. I suspect that there needs to be more care taken with the hermeneutics of translation from natural to formal logical language.
As Geach and Strawson famously pointed out, 'there is no one logical form that is the form of a given concrete argument; one and the same argument may correspond to more than one abstract schema; and accordingly an argument is not shown to be invalid by sharing some logical form with an invalid argument, for it may simultaneously have some form that makes it into a valid argument.' (P. Geach, 'Why Logic Matters' in H.D. Lewis, Contemporary British Philosophy: Personal Statements, Fourth Series, London 1976, pp. 86-99, p. 95.
One lesson to be drawn from this is that coming up with something that sounds like it might bear some relation to what Anselm thought does not constitute the basis for an account of what he thought that is sufficiently nuanced to allow one to draw the conclusion that his argument was unsound and/or invalid. At best, using such an approach one could demonstrate the invalidity or unsoundness of one's own account. But from the perspective of Anselm studies, that would not be very interesting. It would be useful to produce a set of criteria that would allow one to come to a conclusion about the formal validity at least of a complex natural language argument. One of those criteria would have to be that provided by Geach and Strawson: 'there is no one logical form that is the form of a given concrete argument'.
Friday, 11 December 2009
Mistranslations of the Proslogion
One of the most frequently mistranslated passages in Anselm's writings is the following from Proslogion, 4:
'Deus enim est id quo maius cogitari non potest. Quod qui bene intelligit, utique intelligit id ipsum sic esse, ut nec cogitatione queat non esse. Qui ergo intelligit sic esse deum, nequit eum non esse cogitare.'
'For God is that than which a greater cannot be thought. Whoever understands this [i.e. that than which a greater cannot be thought] properly, understands at least that this same thing exists in such a way that not even in thought can it not exist. Therefore, whoever understands that God exists in the same way [i.e. as that than which a greater cannot be thought], cannot think that He does not exist.'
The word 'Quod' is usually left ambiguous. It refers to 'that than which a greater cannot be thought', rather than to the phrase 'God is that than which a greater cannot be thought'.
The phrase 'id ipsum' is commonly translated as 'God' or 'he', suggesting that the translators do not understand the argument at this point. Since this is a summary of Anselm's argument in Proslogion 2-4, that is a problem to say the least.
Interestingly Jasper Hopkins is one translator who recognised this error and amended his earlier translation of this passage (see J. Hopkins & H. Richardson, Anselm of Canterbury, Vol. 1, London 1974, p. 25) in his A New Interpretative Translation of St. Anselm's Monologion and Proslogion, Minneapolis 1986, p. 229.
I have more to say about this in 'Whoever understands this: On translating the Proslogion' in New Blackfriars, 89 (2008) 560-74.
'Deus enim est id quo maius cogitari non potest. Quod qui bene intelligit, utique intelligit id ipsum sic esse, ut nec cogitatione queat non esse. Qui ergo intelligit sic esse deum, nequit eum non esse cogitare.'
'For God is that than which a greater cannot be thought. Whoever understands this [i.e. that than which a greater cannot be thought] properly, understands at least that this same thing exists in such a way that not even in thought can it not exist. Therefore, whoever understands that God exists in the same way [i.e. as that than which a greater cannot be thought], cannot think that He does not exist.'
The word 'Quod' is usually left ambiguous. It refers to 'that than which a greater cannot be thought', rather than to the phrase 'God is that than which a greater cannot be thought'.
The phrase 'id ipsum' is commonly translated as 'God' or 'he', suggesting that the translators do not understand the argument at this point. Since this is a summary of Anselm's argument in Proslogion 2-4, that is a problem to say the least.
Interestingly Jasper Hopkins is one translator who recognised this error and amended his earlier translation of this passage (see J. Hopkins & H. Richardson, Anselm of Canterbury, Vol. 1, London 1974, p. 25) in his A New Interpretative Translation of St. Anselm's Monologion and Proslogion, Minneapolis 1986, p. 229.
I have more to say about this in 'Whoever understands this: On translating the Proslogion' in New Blackfriars, 89 (2008) 560-74.
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